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I. Introduction1
Claiming millions of lives and affecting millions more, the COVID-19 pandemic has
thrust humanity into a period of intense reflection on the fragility of life. However, in this time
when people have been encouraged to care for their fellow human beings by taking the
precautions necessary to protect one another, many have asked the same question as one of
Jesus’ antagonistic opponents in the Gospel of Luke: “and who is my neighbor?”2 In addition to
the virus, it seems, the United States has been plagued by another adversary: non-necessity
toward the other. By claiming no responsibility for the well-being and care of others, no one –
including our friends, family, and loved ones – is considered our neighbor.
In this paper, I argue that Albert Schweitzer’s thought can prove therapeutic on this front.
In his work as a missionary doctor in the Congo, Schweitzer developed an incredibly
comprehensive system of ethics, extending not only to humanity, but to animal and non-sentient
life in toto. In this, Schweitzer emphasizes one’s necessity and responsibility toward all other
manifestations of the universal “will-to-live.” This ethical system has the potential of providing
us a framework to think through humanity’s obligation to one another amidst the COVID-19
pandemic, specifically in our American context. By utilizing his language and concepts and
applying them to our current situation, an argument can be made for the same reciprocity and
mutual care of one another in 21st century America.
I do as much in four subsequent parts. First, I introduce Schweitzer and the origins of his
ethical system with a particular eye toward its theological and philosophical foundations. As
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Schweitzer’s own academic influences were incredibly broad, it can be difficult to conclusively
identify the stimulus for any given facet of his thought when not exclusively and unambiguously
disclosed. However, the combination of these disclosures and personal statements from his
various correspondences allows us to make at least a few convincing arguments.
Second, I move from the theoretical foundations of Schweitzer’s ethic to its practicality.
This discussion primarily centers around the concepts of necessity and antihierarchy – novel
components of Reverence for Life that give the system a pragmatic edge over-against its
European competitors. It is these two key ethical mechanisms, I argue below, that make
Schweitzer’s thought so radically relevant to the American cultural milieu today.
Third, I bring popular American ethics vis-à-vis the COVID-19 pandemic to light. Pulling
from contemporary journalism and social analyses, I showcase both the ubiquity of negative
attitudes toward the concept of ethical mutuality, as well as the development of its opposing
faction in American society. This survey of America’s current ethical attitudes will help to
identify exactly why – and how – Schweitzer’s system can be useful here.
Finally, a way forward is proposed. By applying Schweitzer’s ethical system to our
contemporary situation, I suggest that, in light of the antihierarchical structure of Schweitzer’s
thought, one is obligated to dual acts of necessity: unethical necessity toward the life of the
SARS-CoV-2 virus, and ethical necessity toward one’s fellow human being. These dual acts of
necessity provide a therapeutic inversion to the popular American ethic of rugged individualism
and unrestrained autonomy while also assisting with the reconsideration of the components that
undergird said ethic.

2

II. The Origin and Foundations of “Reverence for Life”
“True ethics begin where the use of language ceases.”3 The world will never again know
the likes of someone who adhered to these words as faithfully as Albert Schweitzer. Prodigious
in the fields of theology, philosophy, and music, Schweitzer left his academic post at the
University of Strasbourg in 1905 to pursue the end of becoming a missionary doctor in the
Congo. He studied medicine at Strasbourg from 1905-1912 and left for Africa in 1913.
Schweitzer felt as though he should not merely accept the untroubled life of security he
was born into when so many others were suffering. He says as much in his biography when
reminiscing about the day, in 1896, he resolved to do something with his life in service to the rest
of the world: “It struck me as inconceivable that I should be allowed to lead such a happy life
while I saw so many people around me struggling with sorrow and suffering…I came to the
conclusion that until I was thirty I could consider myself justified in devoting myself to
scholarship and the arts, but after that I would devote myself directly to serving humanity.” 4
Two years after arriving in Africa and beginning his career as a doctor, Schweitzer found
himself battling an extended case of writer’s block and mental agitation. Convicted by the fact
that he’d only spent time criticizing the ethical failings of civilization and society without trying
to constructively improve upon them, Schweitzer set out to discover the “elementary and
universal concept of the ethical.” However, he did so to no avail: “For months on end I lived in a
continual state of mental agitation. Without the least success I concentrated…on the real nature
of the affirmation of life and of ethics and on the question of what they have in common. I was
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wondering about in a thicket where no path was to be found. I was pushing against an iron door
that would not yield.”5 This continued until one day, when making his way down the Ogooué
River, “there flashed upon [his] mind, unforeseen and unsought, the phrase ‘reverence for life.’”6
This event was the beginning of the ethical work Schweitzer would develop and proclaim for the
rest of his life.
In the eleventh chapter of his Civilization and Ethics, Schweitzer lays out the three things
necessary for ethical thought. In order to move forward, especially into the further theological
foundations, these need to be stated and understood:
[Ethical thought] must have nothing to do with an ethical
interpretation of the world; it must become cosmic and mystical,
that is to say, it must seek to conceive all the self-devotion which
rules in ethics as a manifestation of an inward, spiritual relation to
the world; it must not lapse into abstract thinking, but must remain
elemental, understanding self-devotion to the world to be selfdevotion of human life to every form of living being with which it
can come into relation.7
The first necessary thing, according to Schweitzer, is to proceed without the assumption that
there is an objective meaning or purpose to existence. Knowledge, especially scientific
knowledge, cannot do as much for Schweitzer. Instead, “Knowledge, though ever becoming
deeper and more comprehensive, can do nothing except take us ever deeper and ever further into
the mystery that all that is, is will-to-live.”8
The second necessary thing, for Schweitzer, is that one’s will-to-live, which underlies all
ethical thought, is but a manifestation of one’s relation to the world. The will-to-live stands
subjectively over the world as the position which confesses life to be worth living because we
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subjectively create meaning and purpose in our lives which are ultimately devoid of meaning and
purpose. The propensity to create meaning and purpose in the world inevitably binds one to the
world in an irrevocable way, making one’s self-devotion emblematic of one’s devotion to the
world.
Finally, the third thing necessary to ethical thought is that ethics must never become so
abstract as to be devoid of the very thing it sets out to do. For Schweitzer, the ethics of the
individual and the ethics of the communal interpenetrate; put another way, one’s “self-devotion
to the world” bears the weight of humanity’s self-devotion “to every form of living being.” If
this is true, which Schweitzer takes it to be, then ethics never require prior deliberation when
lived out in the world.
Just as these things are elemental to ethical thought, Schweitzer claims a Cartesian
starting point for philosophy: “True philosophy must start from the most immediate and
comprehensive fact of consciousness, which says ‘I am life which wills to live, in the midst of
life which wills to live.’” Following this, Schweitzer says that “Ethics consist, therefore, in my
experiencing the compulsion to show to all will-to-live the same reverence as I do to my own.”9
This is the baseline understanding of ethics for Schweitzer. It is in line with his European
heritage, which historically has taken a philosophically optimistic, life-affirming attitude toward
existence. However, Schweitzer is also opposing those European philosophers who adopted a
pessimistic, life-negating attitude toward existence, viz. Friedrich Nietzsche and Arthur
Schopenhauer. The major reason for Schweitzer siding with the optimistic, life-affirming
philosophies which have been so dominant in his cultural milieu, I argue, is due to his
theological convictions.
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Though Reverence for Life transcends Christianity, Schweitzer’s work on the life of
Jesus was influential in his development of this ethic. This is especially prominent in his letters,
where he speaks candidly with people concerning the ethic and his first existential exposure to it.
In 1931, Schweitzer writes “The ethics of reverence for life is nothing but Jesus’ great
commandment to love—a commandment that is reached by thinking; religion and thinking meet
in the mysticism of belonging to God through love.”10
Twice more, toward the end of his life, in 1958 and 1959, respectively, Schweitzer says
as much: “I have regarded it as the true mission of my life to advance the humanitarian ideal in
our spiritual life...I encountered it in Jesus’ Beatitudes in the Sermon on the Mount”11 and
“Knowing love for others and for all creation, know the Beatitude, ‘Blessed are the merciful, for
they will achieve mercy’ — that is the goal to which my idea of reverence for life is meant to call
them.”12 Without Schweitzer’s academic work on the life of Jesus, and thereby using that work to
understand his ethical convictions, he may never have constructed his system of Reverence for
Life.
In addition to these explicit references to Christianity and the person of Jesus, there are
times when there are implicit references to biblical passages or biblical ideas. Though they might
not always jump off the page, the underlying influence is there. One example is that which is
quoted above: “Ethics consist, therefore, in my experiencing the compulsion to show to all willto-live the same reverence as I do to my own.” This calls to mind Jesus’ words in Luke 6:31:
“And do likewise to others that which you would have them do to you.” Though it is cloaked in
philosophical-ethical language, the same principle is at work.
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Another, more straightforward, example comes a few pages later when Schweitzer says
“I can do nothing but hold to the fact that the will-to-live in me manifests itself as will-to-live
which desires to become one with other will-to-live. That is for me the light that shines in the
darkness.”13 This is clearly a reference to John 1:5, which says “The light shines in the darkness,
and the darkness did not overtake it.” It is possible that Schweitzer’s work naturally inhabits
Christian language, after having worked with it academically for so many years, or he may be
intentionally tipping his hat toward something unique within Christianity which exemplifies this
ethic. This, unfortunately, is not able to be answered here.
Above, we have briefly established Schweitzer’s ethical thought and its (possible)
influences. The true appeal of Schweitzer’s system, though, is its practicality and ability to be
implemented in the day-to-day life of the ethical agent. This practicality is grounded in two
specific aspects of Reverence for Life that sets it apart as uniquely useful and applicable to our
currently situation. It is to these two components that we now turn.

III. Necessity and Antihierarchy in Schweitzer’s Ethics
The Christian obligation of concern for the other is summed up most succinctly in Jesus’
exchange with a scribe in Mark 12. When asked about the greatest commandment, Jesus first
paraphrases the Shema passage from Deuteronomy 6:4 – “Hear, Israel, the Lord is our God, the
Lord alone, and you will love the Lord your God with your whole heart and your whole soul and
your whole mind and your whole strength…” – and second, claims “you will love your neighbor
as yourself.”

13
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This notion of loving one’s neighbor as oneself is ultimately concerned with the question
of necessity. What is required in order to be a member of a social collective in good standing?
This question of necessity was of the utmost importance to Schweitzer, and in keeping with the
comprehensive nature of his ethical system, so this question was for him all-encompassing,
incorporating all living things, sentient or not. With this in mind, we must turn first to the
absence of a value hierarchy between forms of life in Schweitzer’s system before we can
establish any kind of norm in human-to-human ethical interaction, as this antihierarchical vision
is the foundation upon the entire implementation of Schweitzer’s ethic is built.
This lack of hierarchy is the key factor that distinguishes Schweitzer’s ethical system
from the other prevailing schools of European ethical thought: “Reverence for Life is judged
particularly strange because it established no dividing line between higher and lower, between
more valuable and less valuable life.”14 As is particularly relevant to our current global situation,
Schweitzer went so far as to include microorganisms in his system: “I rejoice over the new
remedies for sleeping sickness, which enable me to preserve life, where once I could only
witness the progress of a painful disease. But every time I put the germs that cause the disease
under a microscope I cannot but reflect that I have to sacrifice this life in order to save
another.”15
Schweitzer’s antihierarchical model is acutely recognizable here as he laments the
destruction of disease-causing germs in order to preserve human life. And it is not lost on
Schweitzer that true ethics, lived in the concrete existence of day-to-day life, require choices and
at times, destruction of life is unavoidable. The ethics of Reverence for Life requires one “to
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decide for himself in each case how far he can remain ethical and how far he must submit
himself to the necessity for destruction of and injury to life.”16
For Schweitzer, any injury to life is an unethical act, even if that act is required for the
sustenance of one’s own. As unique manifestations of the universal will-to-live, any act of ruin
by one will-to-live against another is an immoral act, regardless of its necessity. “In the conflict
between the maintenance of my own existence and the destruction of, or injury to, that of
another, I can never unite the ethical and the necessary…I must choose between ethical and
necessary.”17 In this sense, Schweitzer’s ethics cannot be relativized at all; they are inherently
absolute insofar as they are unflinching in their conviction that all manifestations of life share
equal importance and demand equal reverence.
However, due to the lack of hierarchy in Schweitzer’s ethical system, this necessity of
destruction must be tempered with empathy for that which is being destroyed, regardless of the
kind or classification of life involved. This empathy, for Schweitzer, is the act of seeing oneself
in the being that has been killed, “…of imagining in such life the characteristic which we find in
our own. That is dread of extinction, fear of pain, and desire for happiness.”
When viewed through this lens, animosity harbored toward something like the SARSCoV-2 virus begins to feel misplaced, and may even inspire in oneself something akin to
sympathy at the realization that the virus does not harbor animosity toward us; it only desires to
survive. In much the same way that our bodies destroy the virus in an act of unethical necessity
for the purpose of survival, so the virus does the same thing to us. Recognition of this fact, for
Schweitzer, is an essential step toward the affirmation of Reference for Life. At times, these acts
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of unethical necessity are required for the survival and betterment of an entire community, and
cannot be avoided.
However, though Schweitzer’s system incorporates an allowance for instances of
unethical necessity, so there is also an imperative for ethical necessity, viz. obligatory care
toward the other. Again, with the comprehensive view of Schweitzerian ethics in mind, this
necessity extends to both human and non-human wills-to-live. Ethical and unethical necessity
toward the non-human other is well illustrated in Schweitzer’s short excerpt on the truly ethical
farmer who, coming home from harvesting flowers as fodder for his animals, must avoid
“[striking] the head of a single flower by the roadside…thereby [committing] a wrong against
life without being under the pressure of necessity.”18
For Schweitzer, what separates the second act from the first is the burden of necessity.
Mowing down flowers for the purpose of sustaining life is an unethical necessity, whereas
stepping on and killing a flower inadvertently is an unethical non-necessity. In this particular
scenario, though, the highest good – the ethical necessity – is the behavior that allows the farmer
to avoid inflicting anymore damage and death than is necessary in the first place.
This is, again, portrayed in one of Schweitzer’s letters where he talks about the fact that
he takes the liberty of killing mosquitos in Africa, but not in Europe, since the insects are known
to spread malaria in Africa. As another example of his thought, killing African mosquitos are an
unethical necessity in order to preserve life, whereas the abstinence of killing mosquitos in
Europe is the ethical necessity. For Schweitzer, killing an insect that presents no threat of harm is
another example of the unethical non-necessity.19
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Necessity and antihierarchy are inherently connected in Schweitzer’s thought. Necessity
is dictated as such precisely because of the biological egalitarianism espoused in Reverence for
Life. It is this feature that allows one will-to-live to be obligated toward other wills-to-live in
good faith that life will not be harmed or taken when not under the burden of necessity,
regardless of the specific creature or form of life. With these two key aspects of Schweitzer’s
thought before us, let us turn to the contemporary problem of reciprocity in America and how
Schweitzer’s ethical thought might be able to be leveraged against it.

IV. COVID-19 and the Problem of Reciprocity in America
Popular American ethics are predicated upon a false equivalence. Discussions of morality
in an American context often begin and end with the rugged individualism that has defined the
U.S. as a nation since its declaration of independence from Britain in 1776. Understood as a safe
haven from the tyranny of persecution and governmental overreach, America was founded with
an eye toward personal rights and individual liberties. In more recent history, this was further
fortified by the cultural mania of the Cold War and McCarthyism in the mid-twentieth century.
As such, the American litmus test for what might constitute the notion of “freedom” is
quite a voluntaristic one. Unrestricted autonomy – based almost exclusively in one’s resolve
from moment-to-moment – is often the standard of measurement used to gauge a person’s or
society’s commitment to freedom. However, this begs the question of the definition of freedom,
completely disregarding the fact that freedom-as-unrestricted-autonomy does not exist in modern
society.

ethical, it is instantly classified as “necessary” and the ethical agent is obligated toward it. In other words,
Schweitzer’s system is one in which normative ethics, applied ethics, and meta-ethics conflate into a single modus
operandi.
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Society is necessarily hedged-in by and subsists within the constraint of limits that
protect people from one’s individual rights being infringed upon another’s. Freedom cannot exist
unless it exists within a set of boundaries. While there are seemingly obvious boundaries, such as
particular boundaries around the protection of life and property, there are others that some view
as not so straightforward, especially within a culture that conflates freedom and individualism as
consistently and thoroughly as the United States.
The COVID-19 pandemic has only served to magnify this seeming ambiguity and force it
to the forefront of social and cultural dialogue. As the pandemic has continued to evolve and
spread across the world, the American government, like most other nations, instituted specific
mandates and policies to protect public health. These mandates, though varying by state,
business, etc., often include receiving a COVID-19 vaccine, wearing a well-fitting mask, social
distancing by 6+ feet, quarantining in the event of a positive test, and others.20
From the very early days of the pandemic, these measures have been viewed as political
and conspiratorial in nature. As early as June of 2020, a mere three months after the pandemic
began in earnest, The Guardian published an article commenting on the controversial nature of
masking in America: “Many who refuse to wear masks say it imposes on their individual
freedom.” One woman interviewed is quoted as saying “You’re removing our freedoms and
stomping on our constitutional rights by these communist [sic] dictatorship orders or laws you
want to mandate.”21
Regardless of how misguided these claims might be, they have continued to spread on the
political right. Most recently, there has been an uptick in comparisons of COVID-19 restrictions
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to WWII-era Nazism,22 thus further legitimizing the convictions of those who equate any kind of
authoritative mandate as an infringement upon their personal and individual liberties. Despite
these comparisons being historically inaccurate and offensive to the individuals and communities
who experienced the horrors of the Holocaust, they are becoming more and more openlyaccepted on the political and religious right. Rep. Marjorie Taylor Greene (R-Ga.), a leading
proponent of these metaphors, has claimed that she and those of her same ilk are now “the
[Republican] party’s base, not the fringe.”23
The logic of those who claim the same kind of oppression from COVID-19 mandates as
victims of the Holocaust is convoluted and tortuous to understand, and we are not afforded the
time and space here to attempt to grasp it. However, the purpose of presenting the above
examples has merely been to showcase the prevailing attitudes toward any kind of enforceable
requirement regarding measures meant to protect public health. This has created a crisis of
reciprocity in the United States between those who adhere to mask and vaccination mandates (or
continue to mask and get vaccinated regardless of a mandate) to protect public health and those
who do not believe or understand themselves to be obligated to take measures to protect anyone
besides themselves.
The issue of reciprocity as it is illustrated above is merely the symptomatic response of a
portion of the population devoid of understanding ethical necessity as an essential component of
human-to-human relationships. Infusing our contemporary American situation with the
Schweitzerian model of Reverence for Life merely allows us one way to think through ethical
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issues at a time when every individual is partially culpable for the continued life, or ultimate
death, of their fellow humans.

V. Schweitzerian Ethics as Culturally Therapeutic
Though the pandemic may have put them under a magnifying glass, none of the issues
discussed above are new to American society. However, our current informational situation is.
Between the ubiquity of social media and the post-modern embrace of “alternative facts” - a term
popularized by senior advisor to former President Trump, Kellyanne Conway24 - a rejection of
(among other things) demonstrably provable science has become commonplace. Never before in
history has American society been so saturated with personal opinions that are, 1) regarded as
equally authoritative, and 2) so influential over the mortality of oneself and others.
With this in mind, we must first understand that Schweitzerian ethics will not be
motivational to all. To an extent, the argument presented here is not targeted at those who deny
reality at such a fundamental level. One who denies the very existence of COVID-19 in the first
place cannot be moved toward compassionate care for the other vis-à-vis the pandemic until the
reality of the pandemic is acknowledged. Where Schweitzer can assist us in our current cultural
milieu is in the space that exists between the epistemological acceptance of the pandemic’s
ramifications and one’s ethical responsibility therein.
America has a fundamentally-erroneous understanding of the concept of necessity as an
infringement upon personal rights that has moved beyond the realm of opinion and into the real,
concrete existence of oneself and others. However, rights must be coupled with responsibility in
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order to avoid devolving into narcissism. It is with the absence of interpersonal and reciprocal
responsibility that Schweitzer can assist.
First, though, we must acknowledge that the COVID-19 pandemic requires regular acts
of unethical necessity. Each time someone takes measures to avoid infection and transmission of
the illness, she damages the viral life of SARS-CoV-2, either actively or passively. By wearing a
mask and social distancing, one passively impedes another will-to-live by refusing it the proper
conditions needed to nurture and cultivate its species. However, one actively seeks to destroy the
life of the virus by partaking in the vaccine. These efforts are obviously not undertaken
frivolously, as they are carried out with the intention of prolonging the life and existence of the
human species. With this objective, these measures are indeed necessities, but unethical ones to
be sure, as it requires one will-to-live to exert itself against another.
The ethical status of these acts, though, are contingent upon the perception and viewpoint
of the other. As they are an exertion against another will-to-live meant to impede its life in some
way, they are unethical. But insofar as they are undertaken to protect the life of another, viz. a
fellow human, they are indeed ethical. Schweitzerian ethics, though absolute in their
antihierarchical convictions, are not immune to ambiguous situations during which time two
seemingly-contradictory actions coalesce into a single act of guilty-innocence.25
Viewing these actions from the viewpoint of humanity, we must understand them
existentially as ethical necessities for the care and concern of the other. When we speak of the
other, though, we may be tempted to believe that we have a responsibility, first and foremost, to
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humanity as the pinnacle of creation. However, Schweitzer is adamant that this is not the case:
“We like to imagine that humankind is nature’s goal; but facts do not support that belief. Indeed,
when we consider the immensity of the universe, we must confess that humankind is
insignificant…human life can hardly be considered the goal of the universe.”26 Schweitzer is
speaking here from both a scientific and philosophical viewpoint, as there is no evidence-based
criterion for believing humanity is the apex of life in the universe, nor can any substantive
argument be made in Schweitzer’s own philosophical system for as much.
This displacement of humanity from atop the social strata has ramifications for ethical
agency in the world, as it forces us to confront the question of why we should care for the life of
a particular “other” over-against a different “other.” For Schweitzer, there is not a
straightforward answer to this question. In fact, within the realm of Schweitzerian ethics, the
decision of which life we should save or sacrifice is indiscriminate at best: “…In practice we are
forced to choose. At times we have to decide arbitrarily which forms of life, and even which
particular individuals, we shall save, and which we shall destroy.”27
In the context of our particular situation, Schweitzer tells us there is no objective
argument that demands we care for the human life over the viral life. However, we have the
subjective duty to be concerned, not only with all “life-destinies” in general, but also with all
“human destinies” in particular that accompany us throughout the course of our own existences,
offering ourselves “to the man who needs a fellow-man [sic].”28 Empathy with creatures that
need and desire empathy is what sets humanity apart. We do not pay specific attention to human
life because it is the telos of creation, but because we, as humans, share a uniquely human
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experience: in humanity, one’s “will-to-live has come to know about other wills-to-live.”29 This
positions humanity as a creature unique among creation in that it has the knowledge, not only of
other wills-to-live, but the ability to disregard its own will-to-live in favor of another will-to-live.
In one of his sermons, Schweitzer says “For you there are no strangers, only people
whose well-being must be your concern.”30 For Schweitzer, every person must be the object of
our care and concern; we are directly and without deliberation responsible for the ethical
necessities that will enable our fellow human to maintain her will-to-live precisely because we
have the ability to look beyond our own survival and toward the survival of another. This
responsibility, in any given scenario or situation, is the ethical necessity.
The responsibility of adhering to this ethical necessity takes precedent over individualist
disquiet, as “it is not right to be permanently preoccupied with our own well-being; the welfare
of others and of human society in general must become part of our responsibility.”31 To be sure,
though, it is not lost on Schweitzer that this requires and will require personal sacrifice. Whereas
most other ethical systems seek to establish minimum and maximum boundaries around ethical
action, before and after which one is no longer beholden to the responsibility, Reverence for Life
does no such thing. In fact, Schweitzer tells us that “the ethic cannot be fully carried out without
the possibility of complete sacrifice of self.”32
In view of our current cultural setting, Schweitzerian ethics can prove therapeutic by
forcing us to invert the typical American narrative. Reverence for Life, as an ethical scaffold, is
exclusively focused outward; it is “responsibility without limit” toward the other.33 In stark
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contrast with the historical shape of American culture, it does not reflect back on the ethical
agent beyond the reverence they, and others, must maintain for their own will-to-live. Though
the decision is ultimately left to the agent herself, Reverence for Life directly instructs one to act
against her own wishes, desires, and necessities in favor of another.
The solipsistic sentiment that prevails in contemporary America leaves little room for
self-sacrificial service to the other. Schweitzer’s thought forces us to set aside such egoism and
inquire as to the ethical necessity in this moment in history without recourse to dissenting
opinion. Such opinions hold no authority within the realm of Reverence for Life, as one’s
obligation to the other inherently supersedes one’s desire against that obligation.
Within the current state of affairs, subscribing to Schweitzer’s thought would present
itself as making decisions exclusively with the other in mind and putting aside one’s own
concern-of-self. Getting vaccinated, masking, social distancing, etc. in order to best care for the
well-being of the other amidst our current pandemic reality is the ethical necessity at this
moment. That is not to say that the ethical necessity will remain static; as the reality of the
pandemic changes, new restrictions or practices may very well be introduced. However, the
ethical necessity has the ability to absorb new practices and evolve according to the context. The
only static aspect of Schweitzerian ethics is the imperative to reverence all life fully and without
compromise.
Within this framework, we are offered the opportunity to reconsider the concept of
individual rights, not as unrestricted autonomy for oneself, but as opportunity for protection of
another. Schweitzerian ethics allows us to reorient our understanding of one’s own rights
outward as tools by which we can ensure another is cared for. These rights we are afforded can
be recast, not as a barrier built around ourselves in order to shield us from unwanted obligation,
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but as safeguards in place to protect our ability to continually seek the well-being of another willto-live instead of our own. In this light, engaging the ethical necessity does not present a breach
of our rights, but a fulfillment of them, thereby paving the way to remedy the ethical hazards
associated with conventional American attitudes toward responsibility and obligation outside of
self.

IV. Conclusions
The purpose of this project has been to merely begin a conversation, both about the
prevailing relevance of Albert Schweitzer’s ethical thought, as well as its ability to speak directly
to our current global situation. Rarely are historical, concrete issues settled within the halls of
academia, but it is here that the battles are often fought. This paper is meant to be a single
advancement within the wider ethical conflicts being waged during the pandemic.
Popular American culture paradoxical; it seeks both unlimited, unrestrained freedom
while also desiring to establish boundaries around that freedom, preventing any kind of external
obligation from penetrating it. COVID-19 has served as a spotlight for several aspects of
American society that have long lurked in the shadows, but this is certainly one of the most
outwardly visible. Rather than accepting this shadow-side of American society as inherent,
Schweitzerian ethics allows us to think about these issues in a new way. By both providing a
model for ethical reciprocity between agents, as well as a filter through which we can understand
the issues that undergird the problem of reciprocity itself, Schweitzer’s “Reverence for Life” can
help us adapt and discern the ethical necessity in any and all crises, including the current one, if
only we have the humility to let it.
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